The Catholics have a related term: "vincible ignorance". They are always talking about what's a sin and what's not, so they need a way to figure out what kinds of ignorance are not culpable.

Yes, you can be ignorant about scientific consensus while advocating your own interpretation, but at some point it becomes willful ignorance and vincible. As countermeasures, you should be able to pass the Ideological Turing Test (ITT). If you advance an unpopular/new theory, pass the Alternative Science Respectability Checklist too.

Wilful ignorance doesn't only keep bad theories alive, it also supports the skewed world-views of those in power, e.g. white people – see Epistemic injustice. Then it's called "white ignorance" or "wilful hermeneutical ignorance".

Check out the book Superforecasting by Philip Tetlock.

On average, the predictions you make with 85% confidence should come true around 85% of the time: then we say you are well-calibrated.

Why not go for 100% or 0%, like in the example that if you believed with 60% confidence that a coin was biased one way, you'd be better served betting all of your money on that outcome, rather than 60% of your money on it and 40% on the other outcome. It's a better expected payoff to bet all of it on the most likely outcome.

But calibration is not about betting for a payoff, it's about describing your confidence level to start with. If you are regularly over 90% confident of one outcome that regularly comes true 70% of the time, it's hard to say this overconfidence benefits you in any way.

The Brier score assesses prediction accuracy. That sort of statistic is shown on your PredictionBook/FateBook profile.

Integral for Bayesian methods to use well-calibrated priors.

For example, before Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity, observers would have likely interpreted an image of the Einstein cross as five separate objects in space. In light of that theory, however, astronomers will tell you that there are actually only two objects, one in the center and four different images of a second object around the sides. Alternatively, if other scientists suspect that something is wrong with the telescope and only one object is actually being observed, they are operating under yet another theory. Observations that cannot be separated from theoretical interpretation are said to be theory-laden.[17]

All observation involves both perception and cognition. That is, one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected by one's underlying understanding of the way in which the world functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived, noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be argued that all observation is theory-laden.[17]

Meta-science

Observational equivalence is the property of two or more underlying entities being indistinguishable on the basis of their observable implications. Thus, for example, two scientific theories are observationally equivalent if all of their empirically testable predictions are identical, in which case empirical evidence cannot be used to distinguish which is closer to being correct.