#emacs

Ok, a few steps:

1. Ensure you have a reliable hotkey for embark-act. Do not leave yourself wondering where it is.
2. Spend a little bit of time learning the terminology. Don't just read; after learning what's "embark-collect', try it out for yourself so your monkey brain sees what it is.

Terminology and concepts:

• "Collect"
• "Become"
  • Become a different minibuffer. E.g. if you're in consult-buffer and would rather be doing find-file – maybe not super-useful in this situation since you could just cancel and then call find-file, but can help if you started typing a long filename and realized your minibuffer was of the wrong type, since it lets you keep what you've input so far. There are surely more concrete use cases (suggestions?), but experiment a bit to entrain in yourself that this exists.
• "Export"
  • take the current candidates and put it in a new buffer, e.g. take the matches from consult-grep/consult-ripgrep and put them in a new *grep* buffer, where you'll be able to do advanced things like wgrep.

If unclear what an export buffer can even be for, try the "original inspirations" sans embark to get an idea of why embark-export was conceived: try out wgrep on a multi-occur buffer.

Could be the origin of the adjective "gorgeous", not because he was pretty but because of his frequent use of Gorgian figures, also known as Figures of style.

Studied under Empedocles. Disagreed with Plato on lots of stuff. Taught Antisthenes.

Lakatos realized and admitted that the existing standards of rationality, standards of logic included, were too restrictive and would have hindered science had they been applied with determination. He therefore permitted the scientist to violate them (he admits that science is not "rational" in the sense of these standards). However, he demanded that research programmes show certain features in the long run — they must be progressive… I have argued that this demand no longer restricts scientific practice. Any development agrees with it.

Comment:

In 1975, Paul Feyerabend published his famous pamphlet Against Method, advocating the equivalence of all the way of knowing [5] (science is more powerful only because it is the wisdom of a more powerful civilization, but this is not due to any methodological superiority).

I think that all these separate cultural trends can be summed up, without to much loss of information, by the following statement: between 1940 and 1980, many educated people found very compelling the arguments in the form “If you really believe in something, that thing is real for you”. The bounds 1940-1980 are very arbitrary, and surely in some academic circles this way of thinking has never fallen out of grace. Postmodernist philosophy would probably not have been possible without this tenet.

–www.greaterwrong.com/posts/Hrd27kEdKHb3Kc6mS/the-maximally-relativistic-zeitgeist

Feyerabend:

[S]cience can stand on its own feet and does not need any help from rationalists, secular humanists, Marxists and similar religious movements; and … non-scientific cultures, procedures and assumptions can also stand on their own feet and should be allowed to do so … Science must be protected from ideologies; and societies, especially democratic societies, must be protected from science … In a democracy scientific institutions, research programmes, and suggestions must therefore be subjected to public control, there must be a separation of state and science just as there is a separation between state and religious institutions, and science should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality.

–Against Method viii (is this a real quote? I can't believe the last part)

Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend were friends and critics. Both studied under Karl Popper.

Lakatos saw himself as merely extending Popper's ideas, which changed over time and were interpreted by many in conflicting ways.

Feyerabend argued that Lakatos's methodology was not a methodology at all, but merely "words that sound like the elements of a methodology".[29] He argued that Lakatos's methodology was no different in practice from epistemological anarchism, Feyerabend's own position.

Lakatos contrasted Popper₀, the "naive falsificationist" who demanded unconditional rejection of any theory in the face of any anomaly (an interpretation Lakatos saw as erroneous but that he nevertheless referred to often); Popper₁, the more nuanced and conservatively interpreted philosopher; and Popper₂, the "sophisticated methodological falsificationist" that Lakatos claims is the logical extension of the correctly interpreted ideas of Popper₁ (and who is therefore essentially Lakatos himself).